



The Meaning of Sankhya and Yoga

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I.—THE MEANING OF SĀNKHYA AND YOGA.¹

loke 'smin dvividhā niṣṭhā purā proktā mayā 'nagha
jñānayogena sānkhyānām karmayogena yoginām.

“In this world a two-fold foundation (of religious salvation) has been expounded by Me of old: by the discipline of *knowledge* of the followers of Sānkhya, and by the discipline of *action* of the followers of Yoga.”—Bhagavad Gītā 3. 3.

Philosophy in India has always been practical in its motive. And its practical motive has been what we should call religious. Namely, it professes to teach a method of salvation; to tell man how he can be saved. If it seeks the truth, it is not for the sake of the truth as an abstract end in itself; it is for the sake of the salvation which that truth is believed to bring with it. “The truth shall make you free”—literally “*free*” (*mukta*) from the evils of the “round of existences.” This is the case even with the latest of Hindu philosophies; they all profess to be schemes of salvation. It is more emphatically, more pointedly true of

¹ In this article, “Hopkins” without further specification refers to the essay on “Epic Philosophy,” pages 85-190 of *The Great Epic of India*, by E. Washburn Hopkins; New York, 1901. “Deussen” without further specification refers to the translation of *Vier Philosophische Texte des Mahābhāratam*, by Paul Deussen (“in Gemeinschaft mit Dr. Otto Strauss”); Leipzig, 1906. It is a pleasure to express here my deep indebtedness to these two works, which have made my investigation immeasurably easier than it would have been without them. Considerations of space make it necessary for me to refer to them specifically, for the most part, only when I differ from them; I hope these references will not suggest a failure on my part to appreciate the profound and lasting value of both works. References are to the Calcutta edition of the Mahābhārata, which is abbreviated “C.”; the Bombay edition is occasionally referred to as “B.”

earlier Hindu speculations—because in their time there had not yet developed² sharp differences of opinion as to what absolute “truth” is, such as developed in later times.

In early times especially, then, the question uppermost in the minds of Hindu thinkers was not “What is truth?” but “How can man be saved?” In so far as differences existed between different thinkers or schools, these concerned methods for reaching the goal. The goal with all alike was salvation. And salvation was at first conceived in much the same way with all. But there might be different roads to it.

In the Upaniṣads, at least the earliest dozen of them, we hear little even of such differences as to method. In them the prevailing point of view is that *knowledge* of the truth brings salvation immediately. “Knowing Brahman, to Brahman he goes.”³ He who knows the supreme truth, however it may be formulated, is thereby saved.⁴ This point of view remains perhaps the most fundamental method in later Hinduism. Other methods force an entry by claiming to be “just as good as” the way of knowledge, altho they sometimes end by playing the rôle of the camel and crowding the “way of knowledge” rather completely out of the tent. In the Bhagavad Gītā we are assured that “as a kindled fire burns firewood to ashes, so the fire of knowledge burns all deeds to ashes” (4. 37), that is, frees man from continued existence, the fruit of deeds; and again, “Even if thou shouldst be the worst of all sinners, merely by the boat of knowledge thou shalt cross over (the ‘sea’ of) all evil” (4. 36). What knowledge? The knowledge of the supreme religious truth, which each text professes to teach. Thus in the Gītā, with its ardent personal theism, it is often knowledge of God. Whosoever *knows* the mystic truth of God’s nature is freed from rebirth and goes to God (4. 9, 10; 7. 19; 10. 3; 14. 1 ff.). But elsewhere in the Gītā it is knowledge of the absolute separate-

² At least among those who passed as orthodox. For the present we may ignore the heretical or “materialistic” thinkers of whom we hear something in the epic and even earlier.

³ Kāuṣ. U. 1. 4; the same idea constantly recurs in the Upaniṣads.

⁴ The earlier history of this idea of the saving power of knowledge is discussed in my article on “The Philosophic Materials of the Atharva Veda,” *Studies in Honor of Maurice Bloomfield* (New Haven, 1920), pp. 117-135.

ness of the soul and body, the independence of the soul from the body and all acts and qualities (5. 16, 17, cf. the preceding verses; 14. 22-25). In fact, the Gītā, like other contemporary works and like the Upaniṣads, is apt to promise emancipation to any one who "knows" any particularly profound truth which it may from time to time set forth.

The Gītā, however, is more catholic than most of the early Upaniṣads, in that it admits the possibility of gaining salvation by more than one method. Indeed, in spite of the encomiums on knowledge quoted from it above, it tends to prefer certain other methods. We must remember that there is no reason for thinking of this as an inconsistency. It is perfectly rational to suppose that people may go by different roads, and still reach the same goal—salvation, that is, *nirvāṇa*, union with Brahman or God, or however it may be defined.⁵

One marked difference as to method concerns the question, how far is ordinary, worldly life consistent with the attainment of salvation? Since actions, according to the doctrine of karma, must have their "fruits" for the doer, and so imply continued empiric existence (which is the antithesis of salvation or release); therefore, as the Gītā says, "some wise men say that (all) action is to be abandoned as evil" (18. 3). To avoid the results of action, they propose simply not to act. This quietism, *sannyāsa*, *vairāgya*, is definitely identified in the Gītā with the "way of knowledge," and *the combination is called Sāṅkhya*.⁶ The verse 3. 3, quoted at the beginning of this paper, plainly

⁵ In Upaniṣadic and epic philosophy, while there are different tentative formulations of the supreme truth, they are not clearly or consciously set off against each other; they are hardly recognized as mutually inconsistent. Such school differences as existed among orthodox thinkers (cf. note 2 above) were based on differences as to method, not as to facts (cf. Dahlmann, *Sāṅkhya-Philosophie*, pp. xv ff.), and there was no fixed relation between different definitions of salvation and different ways of reaching it. Cf. Mbh. 12. 11810, and my note 22, below.

⁶ Cf. Mbh. 12. 8804 ff., a treatise on the merits of the "way of knowledge" (*vidyā*), which in 8809 = *nivṛtti*, "abstention, inactivity," and which leads to the highest goal, in contrast with the "way of action" (*karman*, in 8809 = *pravṛtti*, "activity"), which leads to ever repeated rebirths. The name Sāṅkhya does not occur here, but the method described and recommended is precisely what the Gītā calls Sāṅkhya.

states that the "way (discipline) of knowledge" is the Sāṅkhyas' way; and in the next verse it is stated that abandonment, *sannyāsa*, of action (obviously the same as the Sāṅkhya "way of knowledge") is not, in the author's opinion, the best way of salvation; he prefers *karma-yoga*, the way of action. Again, in 5. 1, Arjuna asks which is better, abandonment of action (*sannyāsa karmanām*) or *yoga*? To which the reply is: "Both abandonment, *sannyāsa*, and discipline of action, *karma-yoga*, lead to salvation. But of these two discipline of action is better than abandonment of action" (5. 2). "Fools say that *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* are different, not the wise. He who applies himself to only one of these obtains the complete fruits of both (5. 4). The station that is won by the Sāṅkhyas is won also by the Yogas; he who regards Sāṅkhya and Yoga as one has true vision" (5. 5)—because they both lead to the same end, salvation. Nevertheless, the *Gītā* goes on: "But abandonment (*sannyāsa*) is hard to obtain without discipline (*yoga*). The sage who is disciplined in discipline (*yoga-yukta*) speedily goes to Brahman" (5. 6). It seems obvious from this—and there is no passage in the *Gītā* that is at all inconsistent with this interpretation—that Sāṅkhya in the *Gītā* means the way of salvation by pure knowledge, the intellectual method, and that it is understood as implying quietism, renunciation of action. Yoga, on the other hand, is understood as disciplined, unselfish activity, which according to the *Gītā* is just as good as inactivity, in that it produces none of the evil results which action otherwise produces (5. 3 says "whosoever neither hates nor loves is to be regarded as having permanently abandoned [action]"). This method is elsewhere in the *Gītā* developed at great length (see e. g. 2. 47; 3. 19). Acting without interest in the results of action has no binding effect, and is indeed preferable to inaction, which is an impossible dream (3. 5, 18. 11, 18. 60 etc.). This method of unselfish or disciplined activity, with indifference to results, is what the *Gītā* always means by Yoga when it contrasts it with Sāṅkhya, the (quietistic) way of knowledge. Yoga, "discipline," is synonymous with *karma-yoga*, "discipline of action."⁷ Both Sāṅkhya and Yoga are all right; both lead to

⁷ For a more exact definition of "Yoga" see the last part of this article.

salvation; but the intellectual and inactive way is hard; therefore the other is to be preferred.

Still other methods of salvation were known at the time, and are mentioned in the *Gītā*. In 6. 46 the *yogin*, the adherent of the way of Yoga or disciplined activity, is declared to be superior to the *jñānin*, adherent of the way of knowledge (the Sāṅkhya way just described), and also to the *tapasvin*, adherent of asceticism, penance, and the *karmin*, adherent of the ritualistic method, who depends on (religious, sacrificial) "works" (*karma* is here understood in that restricted sense, as Garbe rightly indicates in his translation). Penance, *tapas*, is more than mere quietism, *sannyāsa*. The comparatively low position assigned to it and to ritualism in this verse does not mean that the *Gītā* denies their validity, any more than it denies the validity of the "way of knowledge," which is bracketed with them here, and which, as we have seen, is elsewhere definitely allowed as a way of salvation. Both penance and ritualism are referred to in complimentary ways in several passages in the *Gītā*, tho perhaps more frequent are comparatively uncomplimentary references. They are certainly not among the favorite methods of the *Gītā*. It is significant, however, that the way of devotion to God, *bhakti*, is not classed among the less desirable methods, either here or elsewhere in the *Gītā*. On the contrary, the very next verse (6. 47) exalts it as even higher than Yoga, or more precisely, as it is here put, as the highest and most perfect form of Yoga or disciplined activity: "Among all possessors of Yoga the most disciplined, *yuktatama*, is he that is devoted to Me." As it is elsewhere put (18. 56 f., 9. 27), he who not only acts unselfishly, but does all acts as acts of service to God, gains salvation most easily of all (cf. 8. 14). The "easiest" way of salvation is naturally the best: why not? Tho there are various ways to the goal, and you can get there by any of them, it is surely only reasonable to prefer the easiest!

Nowhere in the Bhagavad *Gītā* is the word Sāṅkhya used in any other sense than this. *Nowhere is there a suggestion that it—or Yoga^s either—means any particular system of metaphysical truth.* In the *Gītā* Sāṅkhya and Yoga are not meta-

^s I shall speak below of the various ways in which the word Yoga is used.

physical, speculative systems, not what we should call philosophies at all, but ways of gaining salvation; *that and nothing else*.

Moreover, that and nothing else is what they are in all Indian literature until a late time,—until far down into the Christian era.

It seems to me that all previous studies in this field have suffered from the initial error of failing to inquire of the Hindu texts (of this period) themselves exactly what they mean by the words "Sāṅkhya" and "Yoga." The usual method is first to study the Sāṅkhya Kārikās (admittedly dating from not before the 5th century A. D., and admittedly the earliest "systematic" Sāṅkhya treatise); then to look in earlier texts for ideas resembling its ideas, and to call these ideas "early forms" (or "distortions") of the "Sāṅkhya system," taking for granted the *existence* of a "Sāṅkhya system" (in the sense of a speculative metaphysics) at this time.⁹ The fact that the term Sāṅkhya is often associated in the early texts with ideas which are utterly at variance with those of the later Sāṅkhya system has not, to be sure, escaped the notice of previous writers. Of course not; for it is one of the most striking and self-evident of facts. Hopkins's intimate acquaintance with the philosophy of the Mahābhārata led him to the flat-footed conclusion that "Sāṅkhya is . . . an authority claimed for the most divergent teaching" (p. 138). Whether it follows from this that it is also "merely a name to appeal to, and stands in this regard on a footing with Veda" (*l. c.*), i. e. that it really means, or need mean, nothing at all when the Epic refers to "Sāṅkhya," is another question. I hope to show in this paper that a more likely inference from the state of the facts is that the term Sāṅkhya did not, in and of itself, imply *any* "teaching" at all in the sense of any speculative formulation of metaphysical truth, but merely the opinion that man could gain salvation by *knowing* the supreme truth, however formulated.

⁹ Only Deussen (*Allgem. Gesch. d. Phil.*, I, 3, p. 15 ff.) says that Sāṅkhya and Yoga were "originally" not systems, but methods of salvation. This correct view is unfortunately vitiated, first, by the fact that Deussen fails to see clearly just what is meant by the two methods (he overlooks the two most significant passages in the Gītā, 3. 3 and 5. 1 ff.); and secondly by his erroneous concession (p. 18) that Sāṅkhya and Yoga developed into "systems" in the epic itself.

That Sāṅkhya is the “way of (salvation by) knowledge” is stated again and again with the utmost clearness, not only in the Bhagavad Gītā, but in other texts of the same period. This has been duly recorded by some scholars, notably by Hopkins (101 f.). I cannot but feel that the principal reason for the general failure to take this definition at its face value is the underlying assumption that somehow or other Sāṅkhya in early texts must mean something like the metaphysical system set forth in the late Sāṅkhya Kārikās. Now, I admit that it would be wrong-headed to neglect entirely the “Sāṅkhya system” of the Kārikās in a final evaluation of what “Sāṅkhya” means in earlier times. Before I finish, I shall take up this question (pages 32 ff. below) and set forth my views as to the relation between the early “Sāṅkhya” and the Kārikā “Sāṅkhya.” But for the present it seems to me methodologically more sound to close our eyes to that later Sāṅkhya of the Kārikās, and to see if we cannot get a clear and consistent definition of the term Sāṅkhya as used in the earliest texts where it occurs at all, namely, in the Mahābhārata and the later Upaniṣads. These will be admitted by all to be earlier, by a number of centuries, than the Kārikās. I hasten to grant that this does not *prove* that their use of the term “Sāṅkhya” is more original. All I assume for the present is that they represent a fairly circumscribed period in Hindu literature, which deserves—not, to be sure, to be treated as a definite unit, but—to be separated from the Kārikās and considered, in the first instance, absolutely independently of them, and as *comparatively speaking* a unit in distinction from them.

Early Sāṅkhya not atheistic.

So far as I know, it has been almost universally assumed that early Sāṅkhya, like that of later times, denies the existence of any Supreme Soul (Brahman, or God). This has been questioned only by Dahlmann (*Sāṅkhya-Philosophie*, 5 ff. *et passim*), to my knowledge. And Dahlmann cannot be said to have proved his point. He hardly attempts to do so, merely stating, rather dogmatically it seems to me, that “epic Sāṅkhya” is not atheistic. It does not surprise me that he has found few, if any, followers on this point. Even Oldenberg, who is one of

those most inclined to emphasize differences between earlier and later Sāṅkhya, speaks of the former as not recognizing an *īśvara* (God), without giving any proofs however.¹⁰ If this were really the case, it would militate strongly against my interpretation. Here would be a definite metaphysical doctrine, which would set Sāṅkhya off against other "systems," particularly Yoga. This is in fact the most striking difference in metaphysics between the later Sāṅkhya and the later Yoga, which is theistic; and the difference is assumed by all, except Dahlmann, to apply also to early times. So notably Hopkins, 104 ff. It is, to be sure, admitted (e. g. by Hopkins, 137) that there are passages in the epic which represent Sāṅkhya as teaching a belief in Brahman, or God. But these expressions are explained as distortions or misrepresentations of the original Sāṅkhya view.

Where, then, do we find that "original" atheistic view expressed? I believe: *nowhere*. A study of the epic and other early materials (mostly collected by Hopkins) has convinced me that there is not a single passage in which disbelief in Brahman or God is attributed to Sāṅkhya.

There are, however, a few passages which have been interpreted as attributing such views to Sāṅkhya. Hopkins (104) regards Mbh. 12. 11039 as the clearest of these. We must consider this crucial passage at length.

In 12. 11037 Yudhiṣṭhira asks Bhīṣma to explain the difference between Sāṅkhya and Yoga. Bhīṣma replies: (11038) "Both Sāṅkhyas and Yogas praise their own as the best means (*kāraṇa*)."

(11039) anīśvaraḥ katham mucyed ity evaṁ śatrukarṣaṇa
vadanti kāraṇaṁ śrāiṣṭhaṁ¹¹ yogāḥ samyag manīṣiṇaḥ.
(11040) vadanti kāraṇaṁ cedam sāṅkhyāḥ samyag dvijātayaḥ.

[I shall interpret these lines below. The text proceeds:] "Who-so understands all courses (methods, or goals, *gatiḥ*) in the world, and renounces the objects of sense, (11041) after leaving the body is assuredly saved; thus and not otherwise the great sages say is the Sāṅkhya view of salvation (*mokṣadarśana*) . . . (11043) The Yogas rely on immediate (mystic) perception

¹⁰ *NGGW*, ph.-hist. Kl., 1917, 231.

¹¹ Read *śreṣṭhaṁ*? B has *kāraṇaśrāiṣṭhyaṁ*.

(*pratyakṣahetavo*, cf. Hopkins, 105, note 1, and my remarks page 42, note 49); the Sāṅkhyas rest on accepted teaching (*śāstraviniścayāḥ*). And both of these opinions I consider true. . . . (11044) Followed according to instructions, both of them lead to the supreme goal. (11045) Common to both are purity together with penance and compassion to all creatures; the maintenance of strict vows is common to both; the opinions (*darśanam*) are not the same in them.”

Hopkins, with (I believe) all previous interpreters but Dahlmann, thinks (a) that 11039a means “how can one be saved without God?”; (b) that this question is attributed exclusively to the Yogas as distinguished from the Sāṅkhyas; and (c) that it implies that the latter are atheists.¹² Hopkins also says: “It is to be noticed that this (11045) is the end of the explanation. There is not the slightest hint that the anīśvara or atheistic Sāṅkhyas believe in God.” This statement is a bit hasty, I think. Let us see what follows. In 11046 Yudhiṣṭhira, not a little puzzled, inquires: “If vows, purity and compassion, and also the fruits (of the two methods), are common to both, tell me why the views are not the same?” Remember that his original question (11037) was for the *difference* between the two. Evidently he feels that so far no essential difference has been mentioned, but only resemblances; for the fact that the Yogas rely on immediate perception, the Sāṅkhyas on instruction, deals merely with the kind of evidence used by each. If Bhīṣma had already told him that the Sāṅkhyas were atheistic, the Yogas theistic, would he have put such a question as this? Surely that would be a sufficiently striking difference of *darśana!*—Let us proceed. The real answer to Yudhiṣṭhira’s original question, repeated in 11046, comes now. In 11047-98 Bhīṣma describes what Yoga means (the supernatural powers of the Yogin; concentration [*samādhāna*] and fixation [*dhāraṇā*], etc.; not a word of *knowledge*). At the end of this, in 11099, Yudhiṣṭhira says: “You have told me all about the Yoga-way (*-mārga*); now tell me about the method (*vidhi*) that is in Sāṅkhya. For you know all the *knowledge* that is in the three worlds.” Then in 11100 ff. comes the exposition of the Sāṅkhya method, in

¹² Dahlmann, *Sāṅkhya-Philosophie* 169 ff., agrees on a and b, but dissents from c. I dissent on all three points, as will presently appear.

which the *Leitmotif* is *knowledge* all the way thru; knowledge of the most varied assortment of things: first of the *viśayas* (11102 ff.), and the suffering that invariably comes to those devoted to them (11108); “those who are endowed with knowledge, *jñāna-vijñāna*, gain salvation” (11114); then knowledge of the construction of the material body and mind, and the separateness of the soul therefrom, also *knowledge of the nature of God* (11120), of the worthlessness and transitoriness of the world (11155 ff.), and of many other things. In 11158 “the wise Sāṅkhyas abandon the love of children (or creatures, *prajā*) by means of the great, all-pervading *knowledge-method of the Sāṅkhyas* (*jñānayogena sāṅkhyena*),” etc.; in 11159-60 they “cut by the sword of knowledge (*jñānaśastrena*) and the weapon of penance (*tapodaṇḍena*)” the connexions with *rajas*, *tamas*, and even *sattva*, the best of the three material *guṇas*, which is after all “born of contact with the body,” and so (11160-8) they cross over the “sea of suffering” by the “discipline (or method) of knowledge” (*jñānayoga*) and are carried thru several mythic stages (11169 ff.) to the Paramātman, whence they do not return (11175); in 11193 this imperishable supreme Ātman “has the nature of Nārāyaṇa,” that is God (*nārāyaṇātmanān*); “freed from good and evil and entered into that *anāmaya*, *aguṇa* Paramātman, one does not return” (11194); so (11197) “the Sāṅkhyas of great knowledge go to the supreme goal *by this knowledge*; there is no other knowledge like it”; and (11198) “Have no doubt of this: the Sāṅkhya-knowledge is rated the supreme; it is the eternal, steadfast, full, everlasting Brahman”—described ecstatically and at great length in the following verses, in thoroly Upaniṣadic terms. In 11203 “Sāṅkhya is the form (incarnation, *mūrti*) of this Formless One (Brahman).” In 11211 Nārāyaṇa (God) supports (*dhārayate*) this ancient, supreme Sāṅkhya-knowledge.

In all this there is certainly not a hint of atheism. On the contrary, there are abundant allusions to belief in both a personal God and an impersonal, Upaniṣadic Brahman or Supreme Soul. And—be it added—this is quite the usual way in which Sāṅkhya is described in the epic. For no one can deny that it is at least *frequently* made to imply a belief in either the impersonal Brahman or a personal God (no clear distinction is

usually made between the two). Now, I should hesitate to separate the description of Yoga in 11047 ff. and of Sāṅkhya in 11100 ff. from 11037-45, as Professor Hopkins does. These passages profess to contain the answer to 11046, which seems to me clearly Yudhiṣṭhira's reminder of his still unanswered question in 11037. I see no reason for refusing to accept the text at its face value, except an unwillingness to admit that Sāṅkhya is not atheistic.

To return to the crucial 11039-40. If 11039 means that the Yogas accuse the Sāṅkhyas of atheism, it is seen to be inconsistent not only with most (I believe, all) other statements on the subject in the epic, but specifically with the account given of the Sāṅkhya in the sequel to this particular passage. But if it does not mean this, what does it mean? Dahlmann (*l. c.*, p. 169) thinks it means "The Yogas say, 'How can one be saved without (the help of) God?'" He identifies Yoga with the way of devotion, *bhakti*. Sāṅkhya, he says, is not indeed atheistic, but seeks salvation by pure theoretic knowledge, while Yoga seeks it by reliance on the personal help of God. His interpretation has won no adherents to my knowledge, and seems to me unacceptable. My belief is that *anīśvaraḥ* in 11039 means simply the Soul, and that the passage should be translated:

"The wise Yogas declare in clear form the best means (*kāraṇa*) how the soul may be saved. And the Sāṅkhya brahmins (too) declare in clear form this means" (that is, the means "how the soul may be saved"; *idam* is to be taken as referring back to 11039, not forward with Hopkins and Deussen; the same question expresses the aim of both Sāṅkhya and Yoga).

In other words, both Sāṅkhya and Yoga are simply ways of gaining salvation for the soul. This is all that the passage means.

anīśvara means "having no lord, supreme." Like *an-uttama* etc., it is a mere synonym for *para*, *parama*, and (like any word of similar meaning) may be applied not only to the Supreme Soul (Brahman, or God), but also to the human soul, which is regarded as ultimately one with the Supreme Soul, not only in the Upaniṣads but also in epic philosophy. For instance, the Gītā (15. 8) applies the word *īśvara*, "Lord," to the human soul, which enters and leaves the body, and which in the preceding

verse has been called the *jvabhūta* and differentiated from God, of whom it is there said to be a "part." The words *īśvara* and *anīśvara*, like *uttama* and *anuttama*, are synonyms; "the lord" and "that which has no lord" both mean the same thing. In Mbh. 12. 11408 the "twenty-fifth" (the human soul) is also called *anīśvara*, "the supreme" (cf. next paragraph). The same epithet applies distinctly to the individual as distinguished from the universal soul in 12. 8957, where Deussen renders "keinen Höhern über sich wissend."¹³ Finally, as an absolutely conclusive proof that *anīśvara* can mean "supreme," I refer to Kumārasambhava 2. 9, where it (with *nirīśvara* as a v. l.) is an epithet of Brahmā.

Hopkins (126) understands *anīśvara* at Mbh. 12. 11408 (just referred to) essentially as I do; but nevertheless finds in this passage too an implication that Sāṅkhya denies a Supreme Soul. I cannot agree with him. In fact, it seems to me that the preceding half of the same verse clearly attributes to Sāṅkhya (whose views are here being set forth) a belief in an *īśvara* (God? see note 15 below). This description of Sāṅkhya begins with 11393: "Now I will explain the Sāṅkhya-knowledge." This is made to include knowledge of the evolvents of Prakṛti (11394-7) and how they devolve back again into the unmanifest Prakṛti, which is therefore "unity in dissolution, plurality when it is creative" (11398-11400). The Soul (*mahān ātmā*, 11403) is the overseer, *adhiṣṭhātar* (11401, 4) or the *kṣetrajña* (11405-6) of Prakṛti, the *kṣetra*; it is called *puruṣa* when it enters into the evolvents of the unmanifest, *avyakta* = (the unitary, unevolved) *prakṛti* (11405); it is also called the 25th principle (11406). Those who have knowledge distinguish soul from Prakṛti, material nature (11406). "Knowledge (*jñāna*) and the object of knowledge (*jñeya*) are two different things; knowledge is the unmanifest (= *prakṛti*), the object of knowledge is the 25th (the soul)."¹⁴ The next verse, 11408, is the crucial one. It reads:

¹³ Hopkins, 106: "not having (the senses as) a master." I do not get this idea from the word; it would seem to me to need to be proved by other passages, which are not adduced, and which I am unable to discover. Dahmann's translation, criticized by Hopkins, l. c., is quite untenable.

¹⁴ This verse, 11407, forces Deussen to the use of exclamation-points,

avyaktam kṣetram ity uktam tathā sattvaṁ tatheśvaraḥ
anīśvaram atattvaṁ ca tattvaṁ tat pañcaviṅśakam.

“Unmanifest the field (= *prakṛti*) is declared to be, likewise *sattva*, likewise the Lord;¹⁵ lordless (supreme) and un-principled (or, a non-principle) is that 25th principle (soul).” Then in 11409 it is repeated that all this is what the Sāṅkhyas say. And by this *knowledge* they are saved and are not reborn (11412-4); while others, lacking this knowledge, are reborn again and again (11415-6).—Now Hopkins says that in 11408 “the view of a Lord-principle is distinctly opposed.” He renders the verse: “It is said that the Unmanifest comprehends not only the field of knowledge . . . but also *sattva* and Lord; the Sāṅkhya-system holds, however, that the twenty-fifth principle has no Lord and is itself the topic that is apart from topics.” In other words, he sees in *ity uktam*, 11408a, a quotation of a rejected, non-Sāṅkhya view, and thus he reads the *īśvara* out of “Sāṅkhya.” But there is no “however” in the Sanskrit, and I see no trace of opposition between 11408ab and the surrounding (Sāṅkhya) doctrines. On the contrary: the

and indeed sounds startling at first. Cf. 11426, where the second half of 11407 is repeated verbatim, with this addition: “Likewise knowledge is the unmanifest, the knower (*vijñātā*) is the 25th (the soul).” The explanation seems to me to be this: knowledge is here felt as a process, a sort of action, and so material. (For the soul is absolutely inactive; it “neither acts nor suffers.”) The object of knowledge is the soul, for it must be “known” in order that salvation may be gained. But the soul is also the knower. It must know itself; and yet the actual process of knowledge, like any *process*, pertains to matter. The paradox is furthered by the strong tendency to contrast *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* with each other in every possible way; what the one is, the other is not; almost any contrasting pair of terms may be allotted to them, one apiece.

¹⁵ On *sattva* and God as “unmanifest” cf. Hopkins, 121, with footnotes. *Sattva* frequently occupies a special position, superior to *rajas* and *tamas*, in epic speculation; it is often thought of as a kind of abstract (“unmanifest”) state of existence. Indeed, it has pretensions to serve as an equivalent for the material *avyakta*, the primal *Prakṛti* itself, as the principle opposed to the soul, *puruṣa*, *kṣetrajña*; it is clearly so used in 12. 7103 and 9020; and cf. 12. 8678. God (if *īśvara* means God, of which more presently) is of course (at least in his supernal form) also “unmanifest”; even the *human* soul is *avyakta* (Gītā 2. 25 etc.). Since the Sāṅkhyas do not think of denying God,

phrase *ity uktam* is used regularly, and particularly in this very passage, of doctrines that are accepted by the speaker. In stanzas 11404-7 we find doctrines, recognized by all as Sāṅkhya, introduced successively by *iti procyate*, *iti cocyate*, *iti kathyate*, *ucyate*, *ity uktam*, *ucyate*, *ity uktam* again. Then in the very next verse, 11408, we find another *ity uktam*; can it be that it suddenly introduces a view rejected by the author as non-Sāṅkhya? Surely there would be no reason for thinking so, had it not been considered desirable to remove the *īśvara* from a statement of Sāṅkhya doctrine.

The earliest occurrences of the word Sāṅkhya.

I have said that a study of the actual use of the word Sāṅkhya in the earliest period seems to me to make it clear that to the authors of that period the word meant not any metaphysical system, but a way of salvation, namely by knowledge; and that any other terms (such as Yoga), with which it may be bracketed or contrasted, mean other *ways of salvation*—not other metaphysical systems. This idea seems to me to act like the “clearing-nut” on the muddy waters of epic speculation. Many scholars (notably Garbe) have been inclined to throw up their hands in despair over what they consider the “confusion,” the *Wirrwarr*, of the “systems” of philosophy in the later Upaniṣads and the epic. It seems not to have occurred to them that the texts themselves do not profess to teach, under the names of Sāṅkhya and Yoga, “systems” in our sense—logically developed structures of metaphysical truth. Yet this is what the texts tell us quite plainly. They seem confused to westerners

it is entirely natural to find Him mentioned when a list of “unmanifest” things is being given. Nor is this, from the point of view of epic speculation (illustrated over and over again in the *Gītā*), at all inconsistent with calling the (individual) soul “supreme”; the word *anīśvara* is chosen to express this idea precisely *because* the word *īśvara* immediately precedes; no Hindu could miss such a chance for a verbal paradox. Just so the same line says the soul is an *atattvam tattvam*, a “principle that is (or has) no principle.”—It is possible, however, that *īśvara* here does not mean God at all, but simply the individual soul, as in *Gītā* 15. 8, quoted above. In that case this passage could not be used to prove that Sāṅkhya is (or may be) theistic; but still less could it be used to prove that it is atheistic.

only, or mainly, because their aims are not those which westerners assume they should be. If and in so far as there tends to be a general agreement of direction in the metaphysical beliefs which are associated with the term Sāṅkhya, this means only that to that extent the metaphysical beliefs of all Hindus of the period, or at least of all whose beliefs are recorded as orthodox and acceptable in the Sanskrit texts of the period, tended in that direction. *Any* formula of metaphysical truth, provided that *knowledge* thereof was conceived to tend towards salvation, might be called "Sāṅkhya." What may be opposed to Sāṅkhya is not any theory of abstract truth, but a view that salvation is to be gained by some other method than knowledge, e. g. by devotion to God, or by Yoga (which we shall try to define later).

Let us now see just how the word Sāṅkhya is used in early texts; and first of all in the Upaniṣads.

If we limit ourselves to the six or seven earliest Upaniṣads, the answer is easy: it is not used at all. Even if we include the second half-dozen, completing the baker's dozen included in Hume's translation,¹⁶ we find only a single occurrence of the word. This is Śvet. U. 6. 13, which may then be considered probably the oldest record of the word Sāṅkhya. It reads:

nityo nityānām cetanaś cetanānām
eko bahūnām yo vidadhāti kāmān
tat kāraṇam sāṅkhyayogādhigamyaṁ
jñātvā devaṁ mucyate sarvapāśāih.

"The eternal of eternal, the intelligent of intelligents, the one of many, who brings desires to pass—by knowing that divine Cause, which is attainable by Sāṅkhya and Yoga, one is freed from all bonds."

It could hardly be stated more plainly that both Sāṅkhya and Yoga are ways of salvation. Incidentally it is clear that salvation (by either Sāṅkhya or Yoga) is here conceived as attainment of the first Cause, which is rather definitely conceived in personal terms (called *deva*, and referred to by masculine adjectives and pronouns, in spite of the neuter gender of *kāraṇa*, which would make neuter epitheta more natural). Thus in our

¹⁶ *The Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1921.

very first meeting with the word we find the state of things which has been interpreted as a "confusion of Sāṅkhya and Vedānta" or a "departure from the original Sāṅkhya"—these interpretations being due to the assumption, utterly baseless as it seems to me, that Sāṅkhya originally denied a world-soul. The truth is, I think, that even if the term implied any definite beliefs at all, which I think it did not, a denial of the world-soul can certainly not have been one of them.¹⁷ Is it not strange that from the very beginning, and for many centuries, we find only the "confusions" and "blends" and "distortions" of the "original" systems, which crop out in their pristine purity only four or five centuries P. C., or (in the case of Vedānta, cf. below, page 33) perhaps even later?

The Śvet. U. does not attempt to tell us the difference between Sāṅkhya and Yoga; it assumes that as known. Hardly more informing, but equally favorable to my view, are the other references in still later Upaniṣads (all of which may probably be assumed to be not much, if any, older than the average of the Mahābhārata; they belong really with the epic references). Garbha U. 4 speaks of Sāṅkhya and Yoga as destroying evil and bringing salvation. Prāṇāgnihotra U. 1 says "salvation is possible even without the Agnihotra (i. e. without orthodox ritual performances) and without Sāṅkhya and Yoga;" again, obviously, just ways of salvation. Cūlikā U. 14 speaks of the "guṇa-less soul, *puruṣa*, of the Sāṅkhya"—implying that part of the supreme "knowledge" by which Sāṅkhya aims at salvation is the knowledge of the separateness of soul from body (which is often stated at great length in the epic); this is, of course, far from implying that that is all there is to "Sāṅkhya knowledge." Finally, the very late Muktikā U. (which con-

¹⁷ My interpretation dissolves completely all the "difficulties" found in the Śvet. U. passage by Deussen (*Sechzig Upanishads*, 290 f.), and makes it equally unnecessary to suppose with Hopkins, *JAOS* 22. 382 f., that we have in it a theistic "Sāṅkhya-Yoga" system, different from the "atheistic" Sāṅkhya (and also from the Yoga?). The frequent statements that "Sāṅkhya and Yoga are one" mean that they both lead to the same goal, salvation; and usually the very passages which make that statement also make clear the difference of *method* between the two. I do not think there is any "Sāṅkhya-Yoga system" in any other sense, either early or late.

tains a list of 108 Upaniṣads, ending with itself, and which presents Rāma as a divine incarnation) mentions (1. 16, and prose at the end of 1) Sāṅkhya and Yoga among methods by which men (*muniśreṣṭhāh, kecit, anye*) think salvation may be gained (*muktir . . . iti cakṣire . . . sāṅkhyayogena, bhaktiyogena, etc.; kāivalyamuktir uktā* etc.), along with *bhakti* and others.

The Kāuṭīliya Arthaśāstra (1. 2; ed. 1909, p. 6 f.) names Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata as constituting Ānvīkṣakī, "Philosophy," which is described as "an illumination of all sciences, a means for all works, a support for all duties (*dharma*)." This sort of magniloquence cannot be taken very seriously; it certainly tells us little about the real objects and character of "Philosophy," and nothing at all about the difference between the three terms which it groups under that heading. We may therefore dismiss it, without seriously considering the question whether the Kāuṭīliya is really a work of the time of Candragupta Māurya, or whether, as some authorities (including Winternitz, *Gesch. d. ind. Lit.*, 3. 518 ff., especially 523) believe, it dates from a much later time—in which case it would hardly be very pertinent to our present investigation.

Otherwise, the only early occurrences of the name Sāṅkhya, so far as I know, are in the Mahābhārata itself.

First, as to the Bhagavad Gītā. Here it seems to me there can be no question that Sāṅkhya is the way of salvation by knowledge (*jñāna*), and nothing else. The most crucial passages, 3. 3 and 5. 1-6, have been treated above. The Gītā contains three other occurrences of the word Sāṅkhya. In 2. 39 we read: "This point of view (*buddhi*) has been declared for you in the Sāṅkhya; but hear this in the Yoga." The (preceding) Sāṅkhya view must refer to the dissertation on the separateness of soul from body, knowledge of which is necessary to salvation; the passage ended at 2. 30, the intervening verses being parenthetical;¹⁸ they have no relation to either Sāṅkhya or Yoga, according to *any* definition. The same is true of the immediately following verses, which must likewise be parenthetical; they contain an attack on ritualism. The treatment of Yoga (as regularly in the Gītā, the way of salvation by disciplined

¹⁸ N. B.: *parenthetical*, not necessarily interpolated.

activity, dutiful action with indifference to results) begins with 2. 47, and continues thruout the rest of the chapter.

Gītā 13. 24: "Some by meditation (*dhyāna*) behold the Self (*ātman*) by the Self (or, by themselves) in the Self; others by the Sāṅkhya discipline, and others by the discipline of action (*anye sāṅkhyena yogena karmayogena cāpare*)." The discipline of action, *karma-yoga*, is what is otherwise known in the Gītā as Yoga for short, viz. the method just mentioned by me in the last paragraph. Sāṅkhya is not defined in this passage. But obviously it is ways of salvation that we are dealing with; all those mentioned are regarded as possible methods of reaching the common goal, "seeing the Self," which produces release.

Lastly, in Gītā 18. 13 the Sāṅkhya doctrine (*kṛtānta*) is quoted as authority for the five "causes" (*kāraṇa*) or elements in the performance of any action, which are named in the next verse as the material basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*), the doer (*kartar*), the various organs or means of action (*karāṇa*), the various movements (*ceṣṭā*), and fate (*dāiva*). Now the later, systematic Sāṅkhya knows nothing of any such group as this; and so Śankara and Madhusūdana (quoted by Garbe *ad loc.*) felt forced to assume that Sāṅkhya here means Vedānta! Garbe says: "Was in diesen Versen gesagt ist, lässt sich gut auf der Basis des [later] Sāṅkhyas begreifen." Perhaps. But it is equally easy to understand it merely as (here regarded as) a part of that supreme "knowledge" which is accepted by the Sāṅkhyas as the true means of salvation. As I have said above, the Sāṅkhyas are the people who tend to promise salvation to any one who *knows any* truth that for the moment is regarded as specially profound or important. Of course it is not always the same truth in different passages. Some such truths are, or seem to us to be, inconsistent with each other. But he who *knows*—is saved. If you do not believe that, you are not a Sāṅkhya. The importance for salvation of the truth here stated seems to be indicated in 18. 16, 17; the doer, *kartar*, is not the Self; he who realizes this is saved.

So much for the Gītā. It would be impossible here to discuss all passages in the Mbh. which mention Sāṅkhya. I believe, however, that there are few, if any, significant passages outside of the Gītā and the important Mokṣadharmā section of the twelfth

book. And in the following I shall limit myself to this latter section, treating all passages in it which seem to me to throw any light on the meaning of Sāṅkhya and especially on the difference between Sāṅkhya and Yoga.

A good example is the passage discussed above, 12. 11100 ff., in which the constant *Leitmotif* of knowledge is modulated in the most various ways; and it is emphatically knowledge which brings salvation, while in the companion piece (11047-98) on Yoga nothing is said of knowledge; other methods are followed. I have referred also to 12. 11393 ff., another description of Sāṅkhya, culminating in the promise of salvation by true knowledge (11415 f.). Again in 12. 9877-9913 we find a description of knowledge of the difference between matter and soul, with the evolvents of the former; this knowledge is identified as Sāṅkhya and as leading to Brahman = salvation in 9912 f.: "When the body is destroyed, the Embodied (soul) attains the state of Brahman (*brahmatvam upagacchati*); for (the above-described) Sāṅkhya-knowledge (*-jñāna*) is designed to destroy good and evil (deeds, which result in further existence); for in the destruction thereof, (and so) in becoming Brahman (*brah-mabhāve*), they see the highest goal (release)."

Epic "Sāṅkhya" is Brahmaistic.

Interesting is 12. 11347 ff. Here it is first said that "Sāṅkhya and Yoga are one," and in 11348-11367 views are set forth which are declared to be accepted by *both* of them. These views include the absolute distinction between Soul and Material Nature (*prakṛti*), which is emphatically insisted upon. *Prakṛti*, tho having no characteristics (*liṅga*) itself (as *avyakta*, the primal unmanifest matter), is known by its evolvents, which have characteristics, just as the invisible Seasons of the year are known by the fruits and flowers produced by each. The Soul is absolutely distinct from Material Nature and its qualities; it is eternal, infinite, free from suffering, and only owing to delusion seems to be mixed up in the qualities of Material Nature (11356). The Soul, to gain salvation, must free himself from these qualities; then he will see the Highest (*para*), which is declared by Sāṅkhya and Yoga to be higher than *buddhi* (the highest material evolvent), and is realized by get-

ting rid of the Unawakened (*abuddha*; 11358-9). The Unawakened is the unmanifest (*avyakta*, the primal Material Nature), the qualityless (*aguna*) is the lord (*īśvara*), and this qualityless lord is the eternal overseer (*adhiṣṭhātar*; 11360). The wise who are skilled in Sāṅkhya and Yoga and seek the highest perceive the 25th (the soul) after Material Nature and its qualities (11361).¹⁹ "Unity is the imperishable; plurality is the perishable" (*ekatvam akṣaram, nānātvaṁ kṣaram*; 11364); that is, the world of plurality is (not unreal, or false, but) finite, and rests on the basis of a greater, more fundamental unity, which is not finite but eternal. "When, standing upon (= rising superior to) the twenty-five (principles, including soul as well as material nature; *pañcaviṅśatiniṣṭha*) he (the soul) moves forward in the straight and clear way (*samyak pravartate*), then he sees unity and no plurality (literally, unity is his view and plurality is not-[his-]view; 11365)."²⁰ A distinction must be made between the 25 principles (*tattvāni*; note that the soul is the 25th of these; they are obviously the "perishable plurality" mentioned in 11364) and that which is unprincipled (*nistattva*) and above all the 25, eternal, and above the whole crowd of the finite creation (11367). Of course the individual soul is ultimately and really one with the One; but whether in any higher sense than everything else (even matter), is not made clear at this point.

Now, all this—which is fundamentally Upaniṣadic Brahmanism (to adopt a convenient term first used, I believe, by Hopkins, 101, note 3)—is repeatedly declared to be accepted by both Sāṅkhya and Yoga. For it deals only with what the goal of man should be—not with the way of reaching it. To be saved, man must get rid of Prakṛti and "see the Highest."

¹⁹ I am unable to agree with Professor Hopkins, 125, in seeing a contrast between 11361 and 11359; and I hardly think that *sarvaśaḥ* (in 11359) can mean "as a whole," implying (as that English phrase does; this is the whole basis of Hopkins's interpretation) that some are excluded. On the contrary *sarvaśaḥ* seems to me to mean "absolutely all together," without any exception.

²⁰ A somewhat different interpretation in Hopkins, 124. The "plurality" referred to seems to me not, or not merely, a plurality of individual souls; it is exactly the same as in the Kaṭha U. 4. 11, very appositely quoted by Hopkins in a footnote—"the separateness . . . of any part of Brahman from the whole." Cf. below, pages 26 ff., 32.

On this both methods, and in fact *all* methods of salvation approved in the Mbh., agree. But how can one best attain this end? It is on this that Sāṅkhya and Yoga differ; and our passage now proceeds at once to explain the difference, in response to the interlocutor's definite request, 11372. The method of Yoga (by *dhyāna*, with *prāṇāyāma* and *ekāgratā manasaḥ*, etc., see below) is described in 11374-92; that of Sāṅkhya, by *knowledge*, in 11393-11417 (above, pp. 12-14). In all the passage 11346-67, stating the fundamental basis of both Sāṅkhya and Yoga, there was not a word of knowledge, or *dhyāna*, or *prāṇāyāma*, or any other *means* of accomplishing the end. Only the end itself—what salvation is—was described.

“*The truth*” is taught by Sāṅkhya, but accepted also by Yoga.

Since Sāṅkhya believes in salvation by pure knowledge, in the theory that by simply knowing the absolute truth one may gain salvation, it is natural that what is regarded as the absolute truth should be thought of as in a special sense the property of Sāṅkhya. The importance of truth is much greater if knowledge thereof is the direct and immediate means of salvation, than if some other method is to be tried. Other methods, such as Yoga, do not necessarily, or usually, conceive truth as anything different from truth *à la* Sāṅkhya; they merely teach other methods of gaining salvation than pure knowledge alone. So in 12. 11348-67 Yoga as well as Sāṅkhya accepts (as we have just seen) the truth there set forth, but bases on it a different procedure (11373 ff.) from that advocated by Sāṅkhya (11393 ff.). This is made perhaps even clearer in the latter part of the same passage, 11461 ff. The speaker says (11461) he has now declared both Sāṅkhya (in 11393 ff.) and Yoga (11373 ff.); the same teaching (as to truth; *śāstra*) that is declared by Sāṅkhya is also the view (*darśana*) of Yoga. But (11462) knowledge (*jñāna*) is the Sāṅkhyas' means of enlightenment (= release; *prabodhanakara*). And (11463) “in this (Sāṅkhya) teaching, as well as in the Veda, are the forerunners (*purahsarāḥ*; B. °*rah*) of the Yogas;”²¹ that is, Yoga accepts the facts as set forth in the Sāṅkhya and the Veda (which presumably means particularly the Upaniṣads).

²¹ I understand this verse essentially as Hopkins does, 134; otherwise Deussen.

Sāṅkhya does not reject the One (Supreme) Soul.

The sequel to this passage (adhyāya 310 of C., 308 of B.) needs special consideration because it develops the idea of the "twenty-sixth" principle, which Hopkins, 133 ff., identifies with the "personal Lord" and says is denied in Sāṅkhya, but upheld in Yoga. I am unable to agree with him as to this distinction. It seems to me that the passage in question is straight Sāṅkhya. This I deduce from the following evidence. (1) Sāṅkhya is named as an authority in it (in 11483, verse 17 of the adhyāya; for Hopkins's interpretation of this see below, note 25), while Yoga is not. (2) *Knowledge* is constantly stressed thruout the adhyāya, while the usual Yoga methods (*ekāgratā manasaḥ, prāṇāyāma*, etc.) are not mentioned.—I do not doubt that the truths here set forth are understood as acceptable to Yoga too;²² but the method here implied is the Sāṅkhya method.²³

As to the "26th" principle, it is merely a convenient means of distinguishing the enlightened soul from the soul that is as yet unenlightened (*budhyamāna*, seeking enlightenment). In 11476 we are definitely told that when the (formerly unenlightened, *budhyamāna*) soul (the 25th) reaches enlightenment

²² In fact, a later statement of the same theory, 11778-80 and 11793-11806, attributes it definitely to both Sāṅkhya and Yoga (11780, 11802, 11810). Again, as repeatedly above, they assume the same facts, but while Sāṅkhya bases salvation on the mere knowledge of these truths, Yoga uses other methods.—Hopkins, 138, says that at this place (B. 318. 86 = C. 11810) these doctrines are represented "as being newly inculcated, and especially designed for those who desire emancipation, in contrast to the Sāṅkhyas and Yogas, who are content with their own doctrines." But 11810 seems hardly to support this: *sāṅkhyāḥ sarve sāṅkhyadharme ratās ca, tadvad yogā (C. yogo) yogadharme ratās ca, ye cāpy anye mokṣakāmā manuṣyās, teṣāṃ etad darśanam jñānadṛṣtam*. "Both all Sāṅkhyas . . . and likewise Yogas . . . and also all other men who desire salvation—this view is that perceived in the knowledge of (all of) them." That is, Sāṅkhyas, Yogas, and all others, who seek salvation by any method whatsoever, accept these truths. They differ only as to the means of reaching the common goal.

²³ Hopkins, 133, says this adhyāya comes "after the speaker says he has disposed of the Sāṅkhya system" (and refers to Yoga alone). So far as I can see the only basis for this statement is 11461, where "the speaker" says that he has explained *both* Sāṅkhya *and* Yoga. (He refers to 11393 ff. and 11373 ff. respectively.)

(*buddhi*), “then as 26th he goes to *buddha*-hood.” Of course this 26th, the enlightened soul, is especially thought of as “Lord,” *īśvara*, for it is only as the 26th, in a state of enlightenment, that the soul attains its true freedom and realizes its true unity with the One. But there is no difference between the 26th and the 25th except the stage of enlightenment attained. As Oldenberg aptly says (*NGGW*, 1917, 237) the soul’s place in the enumeration of principles is split in two, to provide recognition for a certain qualified difference between the unenlightened and the enlightened soul—without in the least denying their ultimate identity with each other and with the Universal One, the World-Soul (which, when the distinction is made at all, is of course thought of in connexion with the 26th rather than with the 25th; that goes without saying).

To show the basis for this, and incidentally to show that what we are dealing with is Sāṅkhya rather than Yoga, we must examine some parts of the passage in question. We begin with the end of the preceding *adhyāya* (C. 309, B. 307), with the verse immediately following 11463, quoted above. (11464) “No principle higher than the 25th (the soul) is declared, O king. But the supreme principle of the Sāṅkhya has been correctly described as (11465) the (soul) that is enlightened, and that from a state-of-not-perfect-enlightenment becomes enlightened (*buddham apratibuddhatvād budhyamānam ca*) in truth (or, in regard to the principles, *tattvataḥ*). The (soul) becoming-enlightened and that-is-enlightened is declared to be (also) the substance of Yoga teaching” (so that there is, as stated, no difference in the Sāṅkhya and Yoga views of truth).²⁴ Here ends the *adhyāya* C. 309 (B. 307). The first verse (11466)

²⁴ Hopkins, 134, takes 11465ab as referring to Yoga, not to Sāṅkhya (as I do with Deussen); and he identifies *buddha*, “the enlightened (soul),” with the “Lord-spirit” exclusively, for which I can see no ground. All Hindu systems surely believe in the possibility of *buddha*-hood for individuals. Of course, the individual that becomes *buddha* thereby realizes his true unity with Brahman or the “Lord-spirit,” a unity which has existed all along, had he but been able to realize it. In any case, this would not from the epic point of view constitute a difference between Sāṅkhya and Yoga, since as Hopkins points out, 134 note 1, the “personal God” is identified with “the 25th” in epic Sāṅkhya. In other words, the 25th, the 26th, and the World-Soul are really one.

of the next adhyāya promises an explanation of the terms just used. The soul, as *budhyamāna*, which may perhaps be rendered "seeking enlightenment" (really "becoming enlightened," or also "being conscious," cf. below; Deussen, "der des Erwachens Fähige"), "makes himself many" and creates all beings; as such (in the pluralistic, empiric universe) he is not enlightened (11467), tho absolutely different from Material Nature, which is permanently unenlightenable (*apratibudhyaka*, 11469, with B. [C. °*buddhaka*]; cf. 11804 f. for the triple distinction between "the unenlightened [*prakṛti*], the becoming-enlightened [25th, unenlightened soul], and the enlightened [26th, perfected soul]"). When the soul realizes this difference between himself and Material Nature, he becomes free from the latter (11475), and, enlightened by supreme, pure, spotless *knowledge*, he attains as 26th to the state of enlightenment (11476). "Seized with the knowledge 'I am the 26th,' wise, free from age and death (11481), by the mere abstract power (of this knowledge) he undoubtedly goes to identity (with the Supreme; he is then the 26th; 11482)."

- (11482cd) ṣaḍviñśena prabuddhena budhyamāno (C. buddha°)
 'py abuddhimān
 (11483) etan nānātvam ity uktam sāṅkhyaśrutinidarśanāt
 cetanena sametasya pañcaviñśatikasya ha
 (11484) ekatvam vāi bhavaty asya yadā buddhyā na (C. nu)
 budhyate.

These lines I render: "Tho being awakened (or, by a kind of word-play, being conscious) by the awakened 26th, it (the perfected soul) is lacking in consciousness; (for) this (viz. consciousness) is (implies) plurality; so it is declared by the expositions of Sāṅkhya and holy revelation. Of this 25th, united with pure intelligence (*cetana*), unity results only when it is not conscious with consciousness (*buddhi*)." Here, as elsewhere in this chapter, we find a sort of pun on the two meanings of the root *budh*: (1) to become enlightened, and (2) to be conscious (of something; the object is *prakṛti* and its evolvents). This consciousness is a material process (cf. pp. 12 f., note 14), function of the organ *buddhi*, an evolvent of *prakṛti*. As such it must be got rid of by the enlightened soul. And further,

there can be no consciousness after attainment of perfection (= oneness), because after perfect enlightenment the soul is completely merged in the One; there is only the One unity, no longer any plurality, no difference of subject and object, and consequently no consciousness. It is exactly the same theory that is set forth by Yājñavalkya to Māitreyī, Bṛh. Ār. U. (M.) 4. 5. 13-25 (which might be the very *śruti* meant by 11483b): only in the finite, pluralistic, unenlightened world does "one see another, one hear another" etc.; but "when all has become just the soul, by what should he see what?" etc. (So also Mbh. 12. 7973; see below, p. 30.) There is no question of God vs. multiplicity of individual spirits here. It is the old, Upaniṣadic notion of a plurality in the empiric, finite world, but an underlying unity, realized by the enlightened, in which there is no longer any plurality, nor any consciousness, the attribute of plurality.²⁵

Again in 11550-11647 we have a long series of metaphysical speculations, stated (11550cd) to be assumed by both Sāṅkhya and Yoga. It includes, along with many other things, the usual theory of the evolvents of Material Nature, and the Soul as separate therefrom. At the end, the interlocutor asks (11653) for separate statements of what "Sāṅkhya-knowledge" and Yoga mean. Accordingly, in 11655-11673, Sāṅkhya is set forth. As long as the soul (11660) thru ignorance associates with the qualities of Prakṛti, and fails to know itself as different from them, it is not released. Such souls go to hell again and again (11672), but the Sāṅkhyas, by reasoning out this supreme reasoning, go to One-ness (*kevalatām gatāh*, 11673). In 11665 we have another reference to the Upaniṣadic (Brahmaistic)

²⁵ Hopkins, 135, sees in 11483a an allusion to separateness, i. e. plurality, of spirits, as a Sāṅkhya view, rejected in this passage. He translates: "That separateness of spirits [*N. B.*: there is no "of spirits" in the Sanskrit] which is part of the exposition of Sāṅkhya [*N. B.*: Hopkins omits *śruti*, which would seem to mean the Veda; is "plurality of spirits" then Vedic as well as Sāṅkhyan? and does this passage reject the Veda, as well as Sāṅkhya, as an authority? If one, then the other also] is really (explained by) the conditioned spirit when not fully enlightened by the (fully) enlightened 26th." It seems to me that "unity" and "plurality" here are used in the strictly Upaniṣadic sense described above; and that the Sāṅkhya, as well as *śruti*, is quoted as an authority, and accepted, not rejected.

doctrine of the unity underlying all empiric plurality, as in 11483 f. above.²⁶ There follows a treatment of the Yoga-method (11679-11702), preceded by the statement that "there is no knowledge (*jñāna*) like Sāṅkhya, no power (*bala*) like Yoga; both go to the same (end, *ekacaryāu*), both are declared to be deathless" (11676); only foolish men separate them, they are really one (11677); "the same which Yogas behold, that Sāṅkhyas also behold" (11678), namely, the Highest, to behold which means salvation, whether you attain it by "knowledge" or by some other method (such as Yoga). The "power" of the Yoga doubtless refers to the supernatural powers (*aiśvarya*) associated with the Yoga-method; see pages 45 f. below.

I have now considered nearly all the passages which have been used to show that the epic Sāṅkhya teaches plurality of individual souls and denies a single, universal soul; and have tried to show that there is no basis for this theory. Not only is Sāṅkhya constantly associated with a belief in a World-Soul (Brahman) or God; but there is no passage, I believe, in the epic which attributes the contrary belief to it. There remains to be considered one passage, which has been interpreted as presenting the later Sāṅkhya view of independent individual souls, not only by Hopkins (123 f.), but even by Oldenberg (*Upanishaden und Buddhismus*, 1st ed., 254; 2nd ed., 219 f.), despite his general inclination to distinguish between epic and later Sāṅkhya. This is 12. 13713 ff. In 13713 the question is definitely raised: "Are there many souls (*puruṣa*), or only one, and

²⁶ Hopkins, 123, again sees a reference to "plurality of spirits" as a Sāṅkhya view. The verse 11665 reads: *avyaktāikatvam ity āhur nānātvaṃ puruṣās tathā, sarvabhūtaḍāyāvantaḥ kevalaṃ jñānaṃ āsthitāḥ*. This seems to me to mean: "It is (reaches) a unity in the Unmanifest (the esoteric);' so they explain the plurality (of the manifest, empiric universe),—men (*puruṣās*) who, having compassion for all beings, resort to pure knowledge." The preceding verse has just said that enlightened sages recognize "the eternal in the transitory, the unmanifest in the manifest," that is, the One in the many. The whole passage is definitely Brahmaistic. Hopkins: "Those who have the religion of compassion . . . say that there is unity in the Unmanifest but a plurality of spirits." "A plurality of spirits" would seem to me rather to require something like *puruṣanānātvaṃ* or *nānātvaṃ puruṣāṇām*. In any case the context seems to me clearly to indicate the interpretation offered by me.

which is the noblest soul among them, or what is declared to be the source (of them)?" The reply is: (13714) "There are many souls in the world according to the teachings of Sāṅkhya and Yoga; they do not admit that there is only one soul." This sounds, one must grant, like a statement of later Sāṅkhya. But the passage must be considered as a whole. It goes on: (13715) "And ²⁷ as there is declared to be one source (*yoni*) of the many souls, thus I shall explain that universal (*viśvaṁ*) soul, that is above the qualities (of matter) . . . (13718) Sages, Kapila and others, taking thought on the Supreme Soul (*adhyātma*),²⁸ have composed scientific texts with rules and exceptions (i. e. in great detail). But (13719) what Vyāsa has declared in summary fashion,²⁹ namely unity of the Puruṣa(s), from that I will make a statement, by the grace of the Almighty (Vyāsa?)." This is then explained by quoting an alleged conversation between God Brahmā and Rudra, in which Rudra (repeating essentially the question of 13713) asks (13735), how is it that there are many Puruṣas, and yet a supreme One? (That there are *many* is not denied; but in a higher sense there is also One, the source and the final goal of the many, and in Him the many are after all One.) Brahmā replies: "As for the many souls of which you speak, that is quite true; (yet) it (this plurality) is to be regarded as surpassed (transcended, by a higher synthesis), and (thus) not so (i. e. ultimately not 'many'), at the same time" (*evam etad, atikrāntaṁ draṣṭavyaṁ nāivam ity api*, 13737). "But I shall declare to you the basis (*ādhāra*) of the One Soul, how it is declared to be the source (*yoni*) of

²⁷ Hopkins in his interpretation inserts here a parenthesis: "(But this is a mere assumption)"; i. e. he takes 13715 as opposed to the doctrine mentioned in 13714. The conjunction *ca* seems rather to indicate that 13715 is felt as consistent with 13714. The view now to be set forth is (as stated in definite terms below, 13763) thoroly "Sāṅkhya and Yoga" and does not, indeed, "admit that there is *only* a universal soul"—but rather that the Universal Soul is the source of the individual souls, and that they, when perfected, return to It and are merged in It.

²⁸ This phrase is not favorable to a denial of the universal soul by Kapila.

²⁹ *samāsatas tu*; the position of *tu* indicates that the contrast is between the summary doctrines of Vyāsa and the lengthy expositions of the others; no contrast between the doctrines themselves is intended.

the many souls (13738). So, becoming free from the qualities (of matter), they enter into that supreme, universal, greatest, eternal Soul, that is free from the qualities" (13739). This Supreme Soul cannot be seen even by Brahmā or Rudra, who are *saguṇa* (13741); He dwells bodiless in all bodies, but is not stained by the actions of the bodies (13742), remaining free, universal, and independent (13744), as He (13748) is characterized by one-ness and greatness, and He is the One Soul; He alone, the eternal, bears the epithet Great Soul (*mahā-p.*). Some call Him the Supreme Self (*paramātman*), others the One Self, or simply the Self (*ekātman, ātman*; 13753). This Paramātman is eternally free from the qualities; for *He is to be known as Nārāyaṇa* (Viṣṇu, God), since He is the universal-self soul (*sarvātmā puruṣo*, 13754). "He is not stained by the fruits (of action), as a lotus-petal by water. But that other (the individual soul) is characterized by action, and is associated with bondage and release" (13755).³⁰ "For (as individual soul) he is associated with the mass of the seventeen (evolvents of material nature) also; thus the soul is declared for you as manifold" (13756). The Soul is the supreme *dhāman* of the world, the conscious and the object of consciousness, the thinker and the thought, the eater and the eatable, the seer and the seen, the taster and the object of taste, and so both the subject and the object of all other senses, the "knower and the object of knowledge," the "qualitative and the free from quality" (*saguṇam nirguṇam ca!* that is, matter and soul alike! 13757-8). In other words, this is the most fundamental Upaniṣadic Brahmaism (N. B. not "Vedānta"! matter is not unreal). And the section ends with this verse (13763): "This I have explained fully for you in response to your question; I have described fully (the doctrine) that is *in Sāṅkhya-knowledge and in Yoga.*"

To me it seems clear that, considering this passage as a whole, we cannot understand 13714 as Hopkins and Oldenberg understand it. What Sāṅkhya and Yoga³¹ are here stated to believe

³⁰ *karmātmā tv aparo yo 'sau mokṣabandhāiḥ sa yujyate.* Deussen: "Aber als Werkbehafteter ist er ein anderer, der Erlösung und Bindung unterworfen." I believe, with Deussen, that the passage understands the individual soul as ultimately and really identical with the universal.

³¹ Note that Yoga too is represented as holding the same view as

is that there are, indeed, many individual souls, empirically speaking; but that these are all emanations of, and shall (when perfected) return to, One Universal Soul, which is Everything that is. This is made quite clear in 13737, which must be understood as a commentary on 13714. To take 13714 out of its context is unjustifiable; all the more if, as I have tried to show, not a single other recorded passage in the epic is consistent with the denial of the World Soul in Sāṅkhya. Compare 12. 8764, below, page 31.

Sāṅkhya associated with Quietism or Asceticism.

We saw above (pages 3 f.) that in the Bhagavad Gītā Sāṅkhya is not only the "way of knowledge," but is also assumed to imply renunciation of actions—quietism. The stock argument for quietism is that all acts cause further existence, by the law of karma; therefore one should, so far as possible, cease to act. There is however no necessary, inherent connexion between quietism and the "way of knowledge"; and we are not compelled to suppose that Sāṅkhya was invariably understood in this way. Yet, if pure knowledge is to be our means of salvation, it is natural enough to advise an inactive life, given up to meditation, in pursuit of that knowledge. At any rate we find various epic passages, besides those in the Gītā, in which quietism is associated with Sāṅkhya. So the famous Pañcaśikha section, 12. 7886 ff., which is identified as a statement of the way of salvation according to Sāṅkhya (7900). The speaker first deals with certain heretics: the materialists (*nāstika*, 7908), whose view that there is no soul or "self" apart from the body is stated in 7903-9 and refuted in 7910-11; then some unnamed others (Nilakanṭha says, probably rightly, that Buddhists are meant), whose opinion is that rebirth is determined by karma and that this is based on ignorance, but that there is no soul (7912-4), and who are refuted in 7915 ff. But not content with

Sāṅkhya. This is passed over in silence by Hopkins and Oldenberg, but it seems to me that it should have caused them some misgivings. Either the attribution of these doctrines to Yoga is meaningless verbiage (in which case the same may be just as true of Sāṅkhya); or else H. and O., on their hypothesis, must assume that a denial of a supreme soul is attributed to Yoga, which is inconsistent even with the *later* Yoga, a theistic system.

this, Pāñcaśikha also rejects the position of old-fashioned Vedic ritualism (7922-6). After he has completely bewildered his interlocutor and forced him to ask "What, then, is the truth?" (7933), he proceeds at last to set forth his own theory, which, be it remembered, was stated in 7900 to be Sāṅkhya. First he describes the material constituents of the body, which of course includes the psychological organs, *manas* and *buddhi*. But (7944) all this is not the soul; if one thinks it is, his sufferings never cease, while (7945) "when it is seen that 'this is not-soul,' that 'these are not I and not mine,' then there is no basis on which could rest continuance of suffering for him." "Hear now the supreme Teaching of Renunciation (*tyāga-sāstra*), which when declared shall result in emancipation (*mokṣa*) for you. For it is just renunciation of all actions, yes, even of 'disciplined'³² ones, that is always considered grievous torment by the falsely trained" (7946-7). "This one-and-only way of renunciation-of-all (-action; *sarvatyāgasya*) is taught as leading to freedom from suffering; any other way leads to misery" (7949). Salvation is conceived in regular Upaniṣadic, Brahmanistic terms. Souls that are freed merge in the One like rīvers in the ocean, and lose their individuality (*vyaktīr jahati*, 7972). In that state there can be no consciousness (*saṁjñā*), "since the soul is mingled (with the all) and embraced (by it) on all sides" (7973); cf. above, page 25. The climax of the passage, 7974, reverts to the theme of knowledge: *imām ca yo veda vimokṣabuddhim, ātmānam anvicchati cāpramattah, na lipyate karmaphalāir anīṣṭāiḥ, pattraṁ bisasyeva jalena siktam*. Strictly in accord with the usual definition of Sāṅkhya, it is knowledge (here, primarily, of the distinction between soul and body) that is to bring salvation. But this knowledge implies "renunciation" of action—quietism.

A similar idea is distinctly held by the author of 12. 8679-85. "Restraint (of the senses) from the objects of sense know to be the mark of Sāṅkhyas" (8679). In the following verses the quietist is described: he avoids anger, hate, lies; he returns good for evil; "alike (*sama*) to all beings, he goes to Brahmā"

³² *tyāga eva hi sarveṣāṁ yuktānām api karmaṇām*; it sounds like a direct attack on the theory of Yoga, salvation by "disciplined (unselfish) action," advocated in the Gītā!

(8681); indifferent to all, desireless, firm in *brahmacarya*, not injuring all beings, "such an adherent of Sāṅkhya is released" (8685). That knowledge is the method of Sāṅkhya is not definitely stated in these verses, but it is nevertheless implied, as Hopkins says (114), and the following verses make it abundantly clear; they contain an elaborate glorification of knowledge, *jñāna* (see particularly 8688 and 8696 f.).

Knowledge and renunciation (here called by the stronger term *tapas*, penance) are again bracketed in connexion with Sāṅkhya at 12. 8738; *nānyatra vidyātapasor nānyatrendriyanigrahāt, nānyatra sarvasamtyāgāt siddhiṃ vindati kaścana*. Indeed, as in the passage just mentioned, quietism is more stressed than knowledge in this particular verse. But the passage which it introduces (12. 8738-67), and which is definitely stated in 8768 to be Sāṅkhya, makes the standard equation, Sāṅkhya = way of knowledge, abundantly clear. The knowledge meant is again, as usual, strictly Upaniṣadic, Brahmaistic doctrine. The constituents of the body are explained; the soul is enclosed (*vṛta*) in the body; the enlightened soul identifies himself with the soul of all beings and with the Paramātman; in it are all worlds, and there is nothing outside of it (8760). It is both perishable (as individual soul, "in all beings"), and imperishable (as the "divine immortal" One, 8764); another way of putting the idea discussed above (page 27 f.) that the soul is both many and at the same time One. Finally, *by knowledge* attaining (*vidvān prāpya*) this Imperishable All-highest, one gets rid of life and rebirth (8767). "In response to your question I have now (in the preceding) explained to you correctly what is connected with *Sāṅkhya-knowledge*" (8768).

In 12. 11880 renunciation is the "prime means of salvation," but it "springs from knowledge alone" (*vāirāgyam punaretasya mokṣasya paramo vidhiḥ, jñānād eva ca vāirāgyam jāyate yena mucyate*). That is, he who has right knowledge naturally and inevitably develops *vāirāgya*, from which comes salvation; knowledge is after all the fundamental source of *mokṣa*. This appears to be meant as Sāṅkhya doctrine (I shall discuss the passage in which it appears below), and it doubtless indicates the standard Sāṅkhya view as to the relations of "knowledge" and "quietism" as methods of salvation. It is so to speak a commentary, *bhāṣya*, which explains all the passages just quoted.

On the other hand, the Sāṅkhya method has no monopoly of *vāirāgya* or *sannyāsa*. The two are by no means universally associated. And it seems clear that the association, when it occurs, is distinctly incidental, and does not concern the fundamental or primary meaning of Sāṅkhya.

Relation of epic Brahmaism to later Sāṅkhya and Vedānta.

It appears, then, that Sāṅkhya means in the Upaniṣads and the Epic simply the way of salvation by knowledge, and does not imply any system of metaphysical truth whatever. In so far as its adherents tend to agree on certain metaphysical beliefs, namely a sort of developed form of Upaniṣadic Brahmaism, this simply means that all orthodox Hindus of the day tended to accept those beliefs. The chief development within this Brahmaism, as compared with the earlier Upaniṣads, consisted in an increasing attention paid to the constituent elements and the evolution of Material Nature, the non-soul, which in the earlier Upaniṣads had been rather ignored, not because its existence was denied, but because it did not interest the earlier thinkers, who were absorbed in the contemplation of the One Ultimate Reality, which they identified with the Soul. The epic thinkers too, tho they discussed Matter more than their predecessors, did so merely to emphasize its unimportance, its worthlessness. To them also the Soul was all that really counted. And the Soul was still ultimately One—was Brahman, or God. To be sure, in exoteric, empiric, worldly existence there are many souls; but it is only in its finite, “perishable” (*kṣara*, e. g. 12. 8764) form that the soul is plural. And this plurality lasts only until enlightenment is reached. The enlightened soul realizes its unity with the One that is All; for him there is no longer any plurality. This is not “Sāṅkhya” doctrine alone; it is accepted by *all* orthodox schools, as we have repeatedly seen. In fact, to speak of “schools” in this connexion is to run the risk of misleading; if we exclude heretics like the Buddhists and the materialists, we hear of essential differences of opinion only as to the best method of reaching salvation. And, by the by, each of the methodological “schools” generally recognizes the validity of the methods advocated by the others. The Sāṅkhya has, however, a sort of special interest in this Ultimate Truth,

because it is in knowledge of that Truth that Sāṅkhya finds the best way of salvation.

None of the specially characteristic points of doctrine of the later, classical systems of philosophy are found in this somewhat vague and indefinite body of ideas which we may call Epic Brahmaism.³³ And yet we can see clearly the starting-points of all the later systems: particularly of the later Sāṅkhya and Vedānta. In the epic, Material Nature is real, and distinct from the (individual) souls; the individual souls have a qualified, finite reality, but when emancipated realize their ultimate identity with the One (World-Soul or God); that One is, again, regularly conceived as in some sort of relation to Material Nature, say as its "overseer," so that Material Nature, tho real, is only to a qualified extent independent (it is for instance often thought of as the "body" of the World-Soul, His "lower" or "material nature").³⁴ It remained for the Vedānta school of Śankara to carry out to the bitter end the doctrine that there is really only One, namely Brahman, and—with relentless logic—to deduce from this not only the unreality of plural existence of individual souls (the epic comes fairly close to this, without quite reaching it), but also the unreality of all matter (which can be read into the epic only by serious distortions). Much earlier than Śankara, and apparently much earlier than the doctrine of *māyā* as he taught it, is the classical system of the Sāṅkhya Kārikās. This system developed equally clearly out of epic Brahmaism, but in a wholly different direction. It took as its starting-point the doctrine of the absolute independence of the individual souls on the one hand and material nature on the other. It emphasized the contrast between these two principles, and dwelt on the evolution of material nature,³⁵ as set over against the unchanging nature of the soul. Above all it got rid of the World-Soul (Brahman, or God) altogether; a

³³ On this I agree emphatically with Dahlmann, *Sāṅkhya-Philosophie*, p. xvi f.

³⁴ It is sometimes even said definitely that Material Nature springs from the World-Soul (e. g. 12. 13035). This subject will be treated more fully and adequately in my forthcoming book on the Bhagavad Gītā (Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, 1924).

³⁵ Keeping very close in details to older accounts found in the epic; cf. Dahlmann, *op. cit.*, p. 1 ff.

radical step for which, as I have tried to prove, there is no authority in the epic period.

The retention of the name "Sāṅkhya" by the adherents of this later system is easy to understand, and from their point of view seems entirely justifiable. They too were seeking a means of salvation, not simply the abstract truth as an end in itself (cf. the first paragraph of this article). They taught salvation by knowledge; knowledge of the ultimate truth, namely, the truth of the absolute independence of the soul from material nature. Their method was, then, precisely the method of the epic "Sāṅkhya." The metaphysical content of their doctrines was based upon a *part*—an important part—of the content of epic Brahmaism, which had been familiarly accepted by the followers of epic "Sāṅkhya," as well as by the other orthodox methodological schools of epic times. In so far as it differed from that, such differences did not in any way concern the use of the name Sāṅkhya, which applied not to metaphysical content, but to method. From the point of view of early times, the name Sāṅkhya might just as well be applied to Śankara's "Vedānta" as to the Sāṅkhya of the Kārikās; for Śankara, too, taught salvation by knowledge of the truth, and his "truth" was also based on (or developed out of) epic Brahmaism, altho his formulation was quite different from that of the Kārikās. That Śankara did not claim the name Sāṅkhya is doubtless due to the fact that long before his time the name had become associated with the classical system of the Kārikās, which taught metaphysical doctrines to which he was radically opposed. It was only after the formulation of the system of the Kārikās, and precisely as a result thereof, that the name Sāṅkhya came to be associated exclusively with the doctrines of plurality of souls and no world-soul.

It is perhaps unnecessary to say that both the later Sāṅkhya and the later Vedānta, by their respective changes in the older Brahmaism, have introduced what must be clearly recognized as logical improvements, altho perhaps at the expense of "common sense." The epic speculations, like those of the Upaniṣads which they so closely resemble, are unsystematic. It is easy to find logical flaws in them. Matter is eternal and independent, yet somehow dependent on the One Supreme Soul; the individual souls are many, and yet there is in the last analysis but

One Soul; and so on. At least the most glaring of these logical inconsistencies are removed in the later systematic philosophies, by various means. They are thus made to appeal more to the closet philosopher. Yet one cannot help questioning whether their carefully built houses of cards (which after all break down at one point or another—I suppose like all philosophic systems, east or west!) do not lose in freshness, simplicity, earnestness, and vigor more than they gain in refinement and subtlety.

Literal meaning of the word "Sāṅkhya."

If I am right as to what "Sāṅkhya" was originally applied to, it is evident that the dispute as to the literal meaning of the word is settled. It cannot possibly mean "(the metaphysical system) characterized by numbers or enumeration, (the) numerical (system),"—alleged to have been applied to the (later) Sāṅkhya system because of its many numerical categories. In spite of the authority of Garbe,³⁶ Hopkins,³⁷ Oldenberg,³⁸ and Winternitz,³⁹ this view seems to me *a priori* improbable, even from the standpoint of the later Sāṅkhya system. Are numerical categories more strikingly characteristic even of that later system than of other Hindu systems? I doubt it. All Hindu systems, of science and pseudo-science as well as philosophy, love numerical categories and revel in them. Can any Hindu systematic treatise on any subject be imagined that does not abound in numerical categories?⁴⁰ With what less "numerical" system would Sāṅkhya be contrasted in this sense? It is commonly set off against Yoga in particular. Yet the later Yoga system, so far from lacking numerical categories, takes over practically all the categories of the Sāṅkhya system and even

³⁶ Garbe is the originator of this interpretation, and still defends it in *Sāṅkhya Philosophie*², 189 f.

³⁷ Page 127.

³⁸ *Lehre der Upanishaden und Anfänge des Buddhismus*¹, page 208 (2^d page 179).

³⁹ *Gesch. d. ind. Lit.*, 3, page 448, note 2. Jacobi also (*GGA* 1919, 28 f.) thinks that Sāṅkhya means "dealing with enumeration," tho in a different sense, which I cannot take space to discuss here. Formerly (*GGA* 1895, 209) Jacobi accepted the view which I express below.

⁴⁰ Jacobi (*GGA* 1895, 209) remarks very truly that Jainism, Buddhism, and other sects of the time go much farther than Sāṅkhya in devotion to numbered categories.

adds to them. Where is the point, then, in calling Sāṅkhya the “numerical system”?

But of course the conclusive reply to this interpretation, in my opinion, is that Sāṅkhya did not originally mean *any* system of philosophy, numerical or other, but simply and solely a way of gaining salvation, namely by knowledge. If this is so, of course the word can only mean what all authorities before Garbe⁴¹ took it to mean—“dealing with speculation, calculation” in the sense of reasoning, philosophy. Sāṅkhya is the philosophical, reflective, speculative, intellectual *method*. That is why it is called, for instance in the Gītā, *jñāna-yoga*, “way or discipline of knowledge.” It implied in itself nothing as to what truth is, but only an adherence to the intellectual method, a hope for salvation thru knowledge of the truth alone, rather than thru some other means, such as performance of actions or devotion to God. It seems to be universally admitted that the word and its cognates (the nouns *saṁkhyā* and [*pari-*]*saṁkhyāna*, the verb [*pari-*]*saṁkhyā*) have such meanings in the epic and other early literature. Even Garbe grants this (*op. cit.* 189 f.), tho he considers it a “transferred” use of the words. E. g. in Yājñ. Dh. Ś. 3. 158 *śarīraparisamkhyāna* means “reflection about the body.” In Mbh. 12. 11934 *saṁkhyā* (and its synonym *sāṅkhya*, three verses before) is not a philosophical term at all but one of the five “qualities of speech,” and a precise definition is given of it:

doṣāṇām ca guṇānām ca pramāṇam pravibhāgataḥ
kaṁcid artham abhipretya sā saṁkhyety upadhāryatām.

“The weighing of strong and weak points severally, as one presses forward to some conclusion, this should be understood as *saṁkhyā* (or, three verses before, *sāṅkhya*), reasoning, calculation.” (Hopkins, 95, “reckoning”.) As an adjective, *sāṅkhya* would then seem to mean “(the method of salvation)

⁴¹ For references to early expressions of this view see Garbe, *op. cit.*, 189 note 2. For Hindu authorities holding the same view see Fitz Edward Hall, *Sāṅkhyapraśastīkā*, Preface, page 4, note. Cf. Amara I. 1, 4, 11 *carcā saṁkhyā vicāraṇā*; Śāśvata 538 *ekatvādāu vicāraṇe saṁkhyā*. Since, and in spite of, Garbe’s interpretation the older view has been maintained by Deussen, *Allgem. Gesch. d. Phil.*, I. 3, page 15, and Charpentier, *ZDMG* 65. 847.

based on reckoning or calculation” in the sense of the weighing of arguments, reflective reasoning. It was originally the *only* method which claimed a rationalistic, an intellectual, basis. Of course it is not necessary to deny the possibility that the word and its relatives may occasionally be used with conscious and semi-punning allusion to the meaning “number,”⁴² which is unquestionably one of the early meanings of the word *sāṅkhyā*. A Hindu would not be a Hindu if he did not play on various meanings of a word, when he gets the chance. But if I interpret correctly the evidence adduced above, the original meaning cannot possibly be “dealing with numbers or numerical categories,” even if that interpretation were otherwise a natural one, which it seems to me it is not.

The early meaning of Yoga.

We have arrived at a quite clear and sharp definition of the term Sāṅkhya. Can we hope to do as well with the complementary term Yoga?⁴³

As all Sanskritists know, the word *yoga* is a very fluid one, used in a great variety of senses, philosophical and other. It may mean simply “method, means”; and it is used in that sense in many philosophic passages of the epic, notably in the *Gītā* 3. 3, quoted at the beginning of this article (cf. also page 4). Here the adherents of Sāṅkhya follow the *yoga* (method, discipline) of knowledge, while the adherents of Yoga follow the *yoga* of action. Obviously two entirely different meanings are given to the word *yoga* in this one verse. Another meaning is “exertion, diligence, zeal”; used especially to describe a regular, disciplined course of procedure leading to a definite end (in the *Gītā* and other philosophic passages, ordinarily to the end of emancipation). In this sense it is quite natural that it

⁴² It seems to me to be so used at 12. 11410, to which Garbe refers (*l. c.*) as proof for his theory of the meaning of the word. I am unable to see why Garbe refers also to 12. 11393, 11409 and 11673 for further proof. These verses seem to me to contain no allusion, even punningly, to the “number” idea. In fact it is surprizing how seldom we find this word-play, considering the Hindu propensity for punning. If Garbe were right we should expect to find it constantly recurring.

⁴³ On Yoga in the epic see especially Hopkins, “Yoga-technique in the Great Epic,” *JAOS* 22. 333-379 (in addition to his essay in *The Great Epic*).

should have been applied to a system of restraint of the senses and other more or less ascetic practices (later including breath-exercises), conceived as leading either to emancipation or to some supernatural attainment; in popular usage, to any magic power. In the *Gītā*, however (to which we shall for the moment limit our consideration), it ordinarily designates no such system as this, but rather a very different course of procedure, namely the method of salvation characterized by participation in action without interest in the fruits of action. Hence the fuller expression *karma-yoga*, which as we saw from 3. 3 is synonymous with Yoga alone in this connexion. Worldly action is meant; it is particularly exemplified by the duty to fight enjoined upon Arjuna. Fighting is surely far enough from restraint of senses or breath-exercises. Action characterized by indifference is the central principle of the *Gītā*'s Yoga; but the "action" feature is just as important as the "indifference" feature. The word *yoga* definitely implies *activity* as used in the *Gītā*, where it is constantly colored by association (perhaps more or less subconscious) with the other meaning of the word, "energetic performance, exertion." It is thus opposed to the system or "discipline" of the Sāṅkhya, namely the *jñāna-yoga* (the use of the same word *yoga* is confusing) or "way" or "discipline" of knowledge, with definite implication in the *Gītā* (and in some other places, see pages 29 ff.) of *sannyāsa*, abandonment of action.

We shall see presently that other parts of the epic understand Yoga as something quite different from this "disciplined (but worldly) activity," and something more suggestive of its later, classical meaning. We shall speak of them presently. In every case, however, Yoga is—like Sāṅkhya—not a "system" of belief or of metaphysics. It is always a way, a method, of getting something, usually salvation (tho sometimes, especially in more popular usage, a lower goal is aimed at). And it seems to me that the common denominator of all the epic definitions of Yoga is *disciplined activity, earnest striving*—by *active* (not rationalistic or intellectual) means. It is distinctly not "union."⁴⁴ In English we may describe the *goal* of Yoga (or

⁴⁴ That *yoga* does not mean "union" in philosophic language in the Mbh. and contemporary texts is a conclusion which I reached inde-

of Sāṅkhya either) as "union" (with Brahman or God). But it is a striking fact that the word *yoga* and its cognates are *not* ordinarily used of this. Instead, the emancipated soul "goes to" (*adhi-gam*), "attains" (*āp, prāp*), or "sees" (*paś*) Brahman; or if he is said to attain "oneness, sameness" with Brahman, the word used is not *yoga* but e. g. *sāmyatā* (12. 8789 *gacched akṣarasāmyatām*). Cf. Hopkins, *JAOS* 22. 334: "The union-idea of the author of the Muṇḍaka [Upaniṣad] is expressed not by *yoga* but by *sāmya*"; an acute observation, which, it seems to me, applies equally well to the epic. *Yoga* is not the goal but a method of reaching it. As distinguished from Sāṅkhya, the method of knowledge, it means the active method, the method of exertion. Sāṅkhya seeks salvation by *knowing* something; Yoga by *doing* something.

pendently from my study of the texts themselves. Subsequently I was pleased to find that according to excellent authority the word does not mean this even later. Charpentier, *ZDMG* 65. 846 f., says: "Dass das Wort nicht, wie die populäre Auffassung es wollte, 'Verbindung' (der Seele mit Īśvara) bedeutet, ist klar und wird ja in Sarvadarś. S. 129 abgewiesen." So also, according to Charpentier, Tuxen in his book on *Yoga* (Copenhagen, 1911; I regret that I have no access to this highly praised work). Tuxen follows the late commentator Vyāsa in defining *yoga* as equivalent to *samādhi*. Charpentier however suggests that it "eigentlich von der Bedeutung 'Anstrengung' ausgehend, das ganze 'praktische' Treiben bezeichnet und am ehesten etwa mit 'Praxis' zu übersetzen wäre. Denn der praktische Teil ist es doch, der für das System bezeichnend ist—das Theoretische gehört dem Sāṅkhya." I am glad to find myself in perfect agreement with Charpentier as to the meaning of the word *yoga*. I should also accept his second sentence as far as concerns the classical Yoga "system." It would apply approximately to the early Yoga of the epic, if we understand by "System" not a system of metaphysical truth, but a method of salvation.—Dahlmann (*Sāṅkhya-Philosophie, passim*) came near the truth in many ways with his theory that epic Sāṅkhya and Yoga are two parts of the same philosophical system, one the theoretical part, the other the practical. But he, like virtually all others, made the fundamental error of interpreting the terms as names for a systematic philosophy. It seems to me that he exaggerates somewhat the unity and systematization of the philosophic speculations in the epic; but I dissent much more emphatically from his view that Sāṅkhya (or "Sāṅkhya-Yoga") is a name for the "system" (if we can call it that) of epic Brahmaism, or for any system of metaphysical truth. "Die Sāṅkhya-Philosophie," as applied to the epic, is itself a misnomer, as I hope to have shown.

Yoga in the Mokṣadharmā section.

In the Mokṣadharmā section of Mbh. 12 we have several descriptions of Yoga, usually contrasted with Sāṅkhya. They agree with each other in all essentials. In most of them knowledge, the *Leitmotif* of the Sāṅkhya passages described above, is conspicuously absent. Once or twice it is mentioned in passing, in rigmarole lists of virtues or general desiderata, evidently without any deeper significance. In addition to 12. 7129-50, 8769-8803, 11373-92, I would call attention especially to 12. 11679-11702, one of the best and clearest statements. It follows a description of Sāṅkhya (11655-73), called "Sāṅkhya-knowledge" and contrasted with "Yoga-power" (11675 f.) or "Yoga-activity" (*yoga-kṛtyam*, 11682; a very significant expression, used, as Hopkins says, *JAOS* 22. 341, "not infrequently" in the epic for Yoga-practice). This Yoga-activity is two-fold (11682): *saguṇa*, "qualified" (provided with the qualities, *guṇas*; one might almost translate "material"), and *nirguṇa*, "unqualified, qualityless" (free from the *guṇas*, or, as it were, "super-material"; perhaps "exoteric" and "esoteric" would approximately represent the two terms).

11683 dhāraṇam cāiva manasaḥ prāṇāyāmaś ca pārthiva
ekāgratā ca manasaḥ prāṇāyāmas tathāiva ca.⁴⁵

11684 prāṇāyāmo hi saguṇo nirguṇam dhārayen manaḥ.

"(The two stages are:) fixation of the mind, and restraint of the vital powers ('breaths'); concentration of the mind, and restraint of the vital powers. For restraint of the vital powers

⁴⁵ This verse seems to have always been misunderstood. The commentator, followed by P. C. Roy and Hopkins (*JAOS* 22. 341), understands *ab* as referring to the *saguṇa* stage, *cd* to the *nirguṇa* stage, *prāṇāyāma* being common to both. But the following 11684b distinctly indicates that *dhāraṇam manasaḥ* is *nirguṇa*, not *saguṇa*; and 11684a even more distinctly states that *prāṇāyāma* is *saguṇa* alone, not *nirguṇa*. This is confirmed by 11375 (page 41). Deussen refers the whole of 11683 to the *saguṇa* stage, which is shown to be impossible by 11375 (*ekāgratā manasaḥ* there is *nirguṇa*) as well as by 11684b. Since 11684b *nirguṇam dhārayen manaḥ* obviously refers to the stage just described as *dhāraṇam manasaḥ*, this latter can only be the *nirguṇa* stage; and it is therefore a synonym of *ekāgratā manasaḥ*, which is also *nirguṇa* according to 11375. It seems to me evident that 11683ab is repeated, in partly identical, partly varying, language, in 11683cd.

is qualified ('material, exoteric,' the lower stage). One should fix (concentrate) the mind, (making it) free from qualities." Compare with this 12. 11375, where we also find "the supreme power" of the Yogas (described as *dhyāna*, meditation) consisting of two stages, *prāṇāyāma* and *ekāgratā manasaḥ*, of which the former is *saguna*, the latter *nirguna*. The *prāṇas* are not what we mean by "breath" but, in accordance with standard Upaniṣadic usage, the "vital powers" or functions of the human organism; specifically and particularly the senses.⁴⁶ The first or lower stage in the "disciplined activity" of Yoga, according to this definition, is control or restraint of the senses, bringing them to rest "in the mind (*manas*)," cf. 11689, 11377, 11381. But this stage is still "be-qualified," *saguna*;⁴⁷ in order to attain the higher, *nirguna*, "qualityless" stage one must now concentrate the mind (*dhārayen manaḥ*, 11684; cf. *ekāgram dhārayen manaḥ*, 7133; the noun is *dhāraṇam manasaḥ*, 11683, or *ekāgratā manasaḥ*, 11683, 11375), namely, in the *ahamkāra* (11689); then the *ahamkāra* must be fixed in the *buddhi*, and that in the primal Material Nature, *prakṛti* (11690). Or, more briefly, the process may be described simply as sinking the *manas* in the *buddhi* (11381) or in the self, *ātman* (8784), without mention of the *ahamkāra* or the primal *prakṛti* (yet the latter seems to be understood in 11381, for just below, in 11384, the adept is "returned into *prakṛti*," *prakṛtim āpannam*). In any case, when the final stage is reached, all the faculties have come to rest, and one sits like a stick of wood (7133, 11382) or a stone (11694) or a lamp burning in a wind-

⁴⁶ Nothing is said in any of these passages on Yoga about literal "restraint of breath," as practised by later yogins. On the contrary, the explanation of *prāṇāyāma* (as the first or *saguna* stage of Yoga [11683 f., 11375]) is clearly given in 11687 ff. and 11377 ff. respectively: viz., subduing of the *senses*. Of course, according to early Hindu theory, the vital functions or powers are "carried" by the "breaths" in the body; that is why the name *prāṇa* was given to the vital powers, as it constantly is in the very earliest Upaniṣads.

⁴⁷ Cf. 7139, in another description of Yoga; after the external senses have been brought to a complete rest, so that one no longer hears, feels, sees, tastes, or smells (7134 f.), which is the "first stage of meditation," then the "sixth" (inner) sense, i. e. the *manas*, "still stirs." Therefore, one must now proceed to reduce it also, the *manas*, to complete cessation (7142).

less place (11693, 11385). Then he does absolutely nothing but meditate (*dhyā*) on the "eternal Lord and the imperishable Brahman" (11691) and finally succeeds in beholding (*anu-pas*) Him (11386), in reaching equality (*sāmyatā*) with Him (8789). This is, of course, salvation.

The details of this scheme vary, to be sure. I have called attention in passing to some of the variants; it is hardly possible here to go into the matter further. For my present purpose the variations are unimportant.⁴⁸ They are just what we should expect in this period, when there are as yet no cut-and-dried systems, only somewhat vague tendencies. But the central idea of the method of salvation known here as Yoga comes out, after all, quite clearly and definitely. It consists in a course of what we may call, for short, self-hypnosis: a gradual numbing of the senses, beginning with the external ones and then passing to the internal organs, and culminating in a state of trance, in which the adept attains an immediate vision of the One,⁴⁹ and feels himself united with Him.

Superficially it might seem that the self-hypnotizing (if I may use that conveniently brief term) Yogin resembles a quietistic follower of Sāṅkhya (see pages 29 ff. above). But their methods are really absolutely different in principle. The Sāṅkhya quietist is simply doing nothing, because he thinks any form of activity is evil. (Cf. page 3, note 6.) He hopes for salvation thru knowledge alone, which to him implies cessation of all action. The Yogin of the Mokṣadharmā sections has little interest in mere knowledge as such. He is intent on a very definite, quasi-mechanistic course of "disciplined action, effort," which is to bring him to salvation directly. His "action," to be sure, is not normal, worldly action. It involves control and gradual repression of the bodily powers. But this

⁴⁸ I pass over also some details which are presented with a reasonable approach to uniformity, but which do not seem important for my present theme, such as the five "hindrances to Yoga" (treated by Hopkins, *JAOS* 22. 339). On the "powers" (*aiśvarya*) see below, pages 45 f.

⁴⁹ This, I believe, is precisely what *pratyakṣahetavo* means in 12. 11043 (see above, page 9). The Yogas are there said to rely on "immediate perception" (of the Supreme), the Sāṅkhyas on "teaching," knowledge (*śāstra*).

is itself conceived as an active process; it is not a mere passive abstention from action. Without ever having tried it, one may venture the guess that it would indeed be a quite "strenuous" undertaking, involving a good deal of zealous application and "disciplined activity"!

Two different interpretations of Yoga method.

Now, a critic will say, all this is far enough from the disciplined and unselfish, *but normal*, activity (exemplified by fighting) which we found to be the usual definition of Yoga in the Gītā. Yes: but nevertheless it is a way of seeking salvation by a process of activity, by doing something, by "Praxis" (as Charpentier puts it, see note 44, page 39), by practice, by exertion. It fits the definition "disciplined activity" perfectly well. And that is clearly the way in which the term Yoga is understood in this connexion, as indicated by the word (*yoga-*) *kṛtya* (or, elsewhere, as in the Gītā, *karma*; cf. below, page 44), "Yoga-action," as distinguished from "Sāṅkhya-knowledge." Instead of seeking salvation by merely attaining knowledge of the supreme truth, which is expected to bring salvation immediately (as Sāṅkhya teaches), the followers of Yoga seek salvation by a regular, disciplined, zealous course of *action*. Yoga is not concerned with any metaphysical theorizing. It leaves that to Sāṅkhya, to which theorizing is necessarily important (page 21). Yoga does not deny the "truth" asserted by Sāṅkhya; we are even told at times that it accepts it. But its method of salvation lies not thru mere cognition of that truth, but thru a course of active discipline.

The subsumption under the name Yoga of these two different programs of "disciplined activity" is signalized by the fact that even in the Bhagavad Gītā, which ordinarily understands by Yoga the disinterested performance of worldly acts, the other interpretation is not unknown. And the Gītā shows no sign that it is conscious of any inconsistency between the two programs.⁵⁰ In its sixth chapter it gives us a description of the

⁵⁰ That is, at this point. In another passage, 13. 24 (quoted by me page 18), the Gītā seems to make a clear distinction between *dhyāna* (which, apparently, can only mean "self-hypnotism," cf. Mbh. 12. 11374, page 41 above) and Sāṅkhya and "*karma-yoga*" as methods of salvation.

Yogin which, while much less technical than those quoted above from the Mokṣadharmā, decidedly suggests their methods of *dhyāna*, *prāṇāyāma*, and *dhāraṇam manasaḥ*.⁵¹

On the other hand, the Mokṣadharmā section, tho it knows also the Gītā's method of salvation by disinterested but worldly activity, does not seem to apply the name Yoga to it. Quite the contrary: in one passage at least it definitely distinguishes this method from both Yoga and Sāṅkhya. I refer to the conversation between King Janaka and Sulabhā, 12. 11871 ff. Janaka says he has studied under Pañcaśikha, who (tho called specifically a Sāṅkhya teacher in 11878) knows and has taught to Janaka *three* ways of salvation, viz., "Sāṅkhya-knowledge" (*sāṅkhya-jñāna*), Yoga, and the "Royal Method, method for kings" (*mahīpālavidhi*; 11876). These are explained in 11889 ff. "For a threefold foundation (*trividhā niṣṭhā*, cf. Bh. G. 3. 3) in regard to salvation (*mokṣe*) has been recognized by various supreme knowers of salvation. Transcendental knowledge and complete abandonment of actions (*jñānam lokottaram yac ca sarvatyāgāś ca karmanām*) is expounded by some knowers of the science of salvation as the knowledge-basis (knowledge-method, *i. e.* of salvation, *jñānaniṣṭhā*; this, of course, is the Sāṅkhya method). Likewise other sages of subtle insight proclaim the action-basis (action-method, *karmaniṣṭhā*; the Yoga method). Abandoning both of these alike, knowledge and mere action, this third basis (of salvation) has been expounded by that noble teacher (*prahāyobhayam apy evam jñānam karma ca*

⁵¹ See Bh. G. 6. 10-26. Note especially 11-12: *śucāu deśe* (cf. 12. 8792, 8795) *pratiṣṭhāpya sthīram āsanam ātmanaḥ . . . tatrāikāgraṁ manaḥ kṛtvā* (cf. *ekāgratā manasaḥ*, pp. 40 f.) *yatacittendriyakriyāḥ, upaviśy āsane yuñjyād yogam ātmaviśuddhaye*.—In 19 occurs the comparison of the Yogin to a lamp burning in a windless place, as above, p. 41. Again, 24: *manasūvendriyagrāmaṁ viniyamya samantataḥ, (25) śanāih-śanāir upamed buddhyā dhṛtiḥrhitayā, ātmasamsthaṁ manaḥ kṛtvā na kimcid api cintayet*. The last phrase would hardly be used in the Mokṣadharmā sections at all; instead of "thinking on nothing at all" he should "think on the Supreme Soul." The Gītā's expression is semi-popular (one is tempted to call it, in slang, a "give-away"; at least one fears that the activities of some of the "adepts" who were ostensibly thinking on the Supreme Soul may have been more accurately, if less courteously, characterized by the Gītā's expression). Rigid, logical consistency is, however, not to be expected here.

kevalam, tṛtīye 'yam samākhyātā niṣṭhā tena mahātmanā, 11891)." The "third method," opposed to both Sāṅkhya (method of knowledge with abandonment of all action) and Yoga (method of disciplined activity, here clearly, as always in the Mokṣadharmā, in the sense of "self-hypnosis," *prāṇāyāma* and *dhāraṇam manasaḥ*), is of course the *mahīpālavidhi*, "method of (for) kings," referred to in 11876. In the following verses Janaka, who prefers it to the others, explains it at length. It agrees perfectly with the Gītā's usual definition of Yoga, viz., remaining in the world (specifically in the life of a prince, just as in Arjuna's case), and performing all acts required by the traditional duties of the station to which one is born, but with indifference to results. The same arguments are used that are found in the Gītā.—In the sequel Janaka's arguments for this method are refuted by Sulabhā, who declares that it is impossible for a king to be saved while keeping his kingdom. She demands renunciation in *deeds* as well as in thoughts. This makes me rather inclined to suspect that the passage is a definite polemic against the Bhagavad Gītā—as it certainly is a polemic against one of its cardinal doctrines. Our passage (which in 11889 has what looks suspiciously like an echo of Bh. G. 3. 3) says point-blank: the claim that the Yoga method may be interpreted as disinterested activity while remaining in worldly life, is false. This is not true Yoga, but a different method, and an unsound one; those who hope for salvation thru it are deluded.

There is, in any case, no doubt of the fact that the Gītā's interpretation of Yoga (tho etymologically it fits the word admirably) was not the usual one, either in epic times or later. It is obvious that the later, classical system of the Yoga-sūtras is based upon the method of salvation described in the Mokṣadharmā sections. And the use of the words *yoga* and *yogin* in popular language in the epic itself (see Hopkins's study in *JAOS* 22, *passim*), referring to the possession of various supernatural or magic powers, shows that this interpretation was commoner in early times as well. For the supernatural powers (*āśvarya*) connected with Yoga are, of course, only to be associated with self-hypnotism, trances, and the like; not with the life of a prince or warrior, even tho he be a dutiful and unselfish one. Even in the Mokṣadharmā section (12. 11062) we are told

that "the Yoga (masculine, = *yogin*), attaining power (*bala*, cf. 12. 11676, "there is no knowledge like Sāṅkhya, no power like Yoga"), may assume many thousands of selves (*ātman*s, i. e., may make himself thousandfold) and roam about the earth in all these guises"; in the following verses it is said that in one form he can enjoy the objects of sense, while simultaneously in another form he can perform the severest penance, etc. However, the author of this same passage regards such powers as comparatively trivial. In 11065, after disposing of these "powers," he says he will now explain the subtle (*sūkṣma*), i. e. superior, powers of the Yogin. This he does in 11066 ff.; they consist simply in the power of attaining salvation, or the highest goal. In fact, other passages definitely deprecate any interest in the supernatural powers. Cf. 12. 8685 f.: "Understand (now, after the Sāṅkhya method has been described) how and by what means men reach salvation thru Yoga. He who, having transcended the supernatural powers of Yoga, ceases (from worldly or sensory activities), is released (*yogāiśvaryam atikrānto yo niṣkrāmati mucyate*)." And, more clearly, 12. 7180: "The reciter who takes delight in undertakings to gain supernatural powers (*athāiśvarya-pravṛtṣu jāpakas tatra rajyate*), that very thing means hell for him. By that means he does not gain emancipation (*sa eva nirayas tasya nāsāu tasmāt pramucyate*)." The supernatural powers are at best trivial and incidental acquisitions on the way to the supreme goal. But naturally in the popular consciousness they loomed large, and were responsible for many a degradation of the Yoga method, not only in later times, but even in the time of the epic.

I cannot here take up more at length the question of certain other "methods of salvation" which are mentioned in the epic, such as ritualism, asceticism (*tapas*), and devotion to God (*bhakti*). They are sometimes clearly distinguished from both the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga methods, sometimes more or less blended with one of them (usually Yoga, since the definition of Yoga is, as we have seen, elastic enough to include any program that can be regarded as a course of *action*). Compare Bhagavad Gītā 6. 46 f. and 13. 24 f. (pages 5 and 18 above).

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